A value with incomplete communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hamiache, G
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0641
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 59-78
• 关键词: value; graph; associated game; Consistency; Perron-Frobenius theorem; nonnegative matrix

摘要

The aim of this article is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game is defined and the value has to verify a consistency axiom. The generalization proposed here is different from the Myerson value, and it coincides with the Shapley value in the case of full communication. Classification Number: C71. (C) 1999 Academic Press.