-
作者：Saari, DG; Sieberg, KK
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine; William & Mary
摘要：While it is troubling when power-index values change with the index, the problem is more severe: Different indices can generate radically different rankings. For example, a 15-player game exists with over a trillion different strict index rankings of the players. In contrast, with a fixed number of players certain indices always share the same ranking: e.g., the Shapley and Banzhaf rankings agree with three players, but they can have opposite rankings with more players. It is explained why ind...
-
作者：Biswas, AK; Parthasarathy, T; Ravindran, G
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Bangalore; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：In general, there are examples of TU games where the core is stable but is not large. In this paper, we show that the extendability condition introduced by Kikuta and Shapley (1986, Core Stability in n-Person Games, Mimeo) is sufficient for the core to be stable as well as large, for TU games with five or fewer players. We provide a counter example when the number of players is six. We then introduce a stronger extendability condition and show that it is necessary and sufficient for the core t...
-
作者：Greenwald, A; Friedman, EJ; Shenker, S
作者单位：Brown University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：This paper describes the results of simulation experiments performed on a suits of learning algorithms. We focus on games in network contexts. These are contexts in which (1) agents have very limited information about the game and (2) play can be extremely asynchronous. There are many proposed learning algorithms in the literature. We choose a small sampling of such algorithms and use numerical simulation to explore the nature of asymptotic play. In particular, we explore the extent to which t...
-
作者：Nisan, N; Ronen, A
作者单位：Reichman University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents' interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concer...
-
作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London
摘要：Selten (1980, J. Theoret. Biol., 84, 93-101) showed that no mixed equilibria are evolutionarily stable when players can condition their strategies on their roles in a game. Alternatively, Harsanyi's (1973, Int. J. Game Theory, 2, 1-23) purification argument implies that all mixed equilibria are approximations of strict, and hence evolutionarily stable, equilibria of games with slightly perturbed payoffs. This paper reconciles these results: Approximations of mixed equilibria have high invasion...
-
作者：Wellman, MP; Walsh, WE; Wurman, PR; MacKie-Mason, JK
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; North Carolina State University
摘要：Decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time, where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents. Market mechanisms use prices derived through distributing bidding protocols to determine schedules. We investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, the quality of equilibrium solutions, and the behavior of an ascending auction mechanism and bidding protocol. To remedy the potential ...
-
作者：Bosch-Domènech, A; Sáez-Martí, M
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game (which we interpret as a borrower-tender relation), we study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching setup, and we test its predictions. The theoretical model provides conditions for changes in qualitative aggregate behavior in response to variations in structural parameters. While it turns out that Nash equilibrium is not a reliable predictor of a...
-
作者：Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine a version of Rubinstein's Electronic Mail Game in which the noisy communications technology is voluntary and costly. Multiple Nash equilibria exist, including an equilibrium in which messages are ignored, and an equilibrium in which only one message is sent, revealing the state of nature and allowing coordination on the relevant action whenever this message arrives. The equilibrium in which messages are ignored is eliminated by an appropriate evolutionary stability condition. The re...
-
作者：[Anonymous]
-
作者：Izquierdo, JM; Rafels, C
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：A subclass of monotonic transferable utility (TU.) games is studied: average monotonic games. These games are totally balanced. We prove that the core coincides with both the bargaining set A la Davis and Maschler and the bargaining set a la Mas-Colell. To obtain this result a technique based on reduced games is used. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
