Some surprising properties of power indices
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Saari, DG; Sieberg, KK
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine; William & Mary
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.2000.0819
发表日期：
2001
页码：
241-263
关键词：
摘要：
While it is troubling when power-index values change with the index, the problem is more severe: Different indices can generate radically different rankings. For example, a 15-player game exists with over a trillion different strict index rankings of the players. In contrast, with a fixed number of players certain indices always share the same ranking: e.g., the Shapley and Banzhaf rankings agree with three players, but they can have opposite rankings with more players. It is explained why index outcomes can be sensitive to assumptions and to when players leave a game. (C) 2000 Academic Press.