Evolution and mixed strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0813
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 200-226
• 关键词: evolutionary stability; ESS; mixed strategy; Asymmetric game

摘要

Selten (1980, J. Theoret. Biol., 84, 93-101) showed that no mixed equilibria are evolutionarily stable when players can condition their strategies on their roles in a game. Alternatively, Harsanyi's (1973, Int. J. Game Theory, 2, 1-23) purification argument implies that all mixed equilibria are approximations of strict, and hence evolutionarily stable, equilibria of games with slightly perturbed payoffs. This paper reconciles these results: Approximations of mixed equilibria have high invasion barriers, and hence are likely to persist, when payoff perturbations are relatively important and role identification is relatively noisy. When payoff perturbations are unimportant and role identification is precise, approximations of mixed equilibria will have small invasion barriers and are unlikely to persist. Classification Numbers: C70, C78. (C) 2001 Academic Press.