Coordinated action in the Electronic Mail Game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Binmore, K; Samuelson, L
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0749
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 6-30
• 关键词: electronic mail game; coordinated attack problem; COMMUNICATION; evolutionarily stable strategy

摘要

We examine a version of Rubinstein's Electronic Mail Game in which the noisy communications technology is voluntary and costly. Multiple Nash equilibria exist, including an equilibrium in which messages are ignored, and an equilibrium in which only one message is sent, revealing the state of nature and allowing coordination on the relevant action whenever this message arrives. The equilibrium in which messages are ignored is eliminated by an appropriate evolutionary stability condition. The remaining equilibria survive this criterion, including the equilibrium in which only one message is sent as well as equilibria in which longer strings of messages are exchanged. (C) 2001 Academic Press.