Algorithmic mechanism design
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Nisan, N; Ronen, A
署名单位：
Reichman University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1999.0790
发表日期：
2001
页码：
166-196
关键词：
摘要：
We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants cannot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such participants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the agents' interests are best served by behaving correctly. Following notions from the field of mechanism design, we suggest a framework for studying such algorithms. Our main technical contribution concerns the study of a representative task scheduling problem for which the standard mechanism design tools do not suffice. (C) 2001 Academic Press.