Cycles of aggregate behavior in theory and experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bosch-Domènech, A; Sáez-Martí, M
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University; Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0821
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 105-137
• 关键词: cycles; evolutionary dynamics; games; experiments

摘要

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game (which we interpret as a borrower-tender relation), we study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching setup, and we test its predictions. The theoretical model provides conditions for changes in qualitative aggregate behavior in response to variations in structural parameters. While it turns out that Nash equilibrium is not a reliable predictor of average aggregate behavior, the experiment seems to confirm the qualitative predictions of the evolutionary model under structural changes. (C) 2001 Academic Press.