Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Wellman, MP; Walsh, WE; Wurman, PR; MacKie-Mason, JK
署名单位：
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; North Carolina State University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.2000.0822
发表日期：
2001
页码：
271-303
关键词：
摘要：
Decentralized scheduling is the problem of allocating resources to alternative possible uses over time, where competing uses are represented by autonomous agents. Market mechanisms use prices derived through distributing bidding protocols to determine schedules. We investigate the existence of equilibrium prices for some general classes of scheduling problems, the quality of equilibrium solutions, and the behavior of an ascending auction mechanism and bidding protocol. To remedy the potential nonexistence of price equilibria due to complementarities in preference, we introduce additional markets in combinations of basic goods. Finally, we consider direct revelation mechanisms and compare to the market-based approach. (C) 2001 Academic Press.