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作者：Wurman, PR; Wellman, MP; Walsh, WE
作者单位：North Carolina State University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We present an extensive breakdown of the auction design space that captures the essential similarities and differences of many auction mechanisms in a format more descriptive and useful than simple taxonomies. This parametrization serves as an organizational framework in which to classify work within the field and uncovers parameter combinations corresponding to novel mechanisms. The structured characterization of auction rules can be exploited for the modular design of configurable auction se...
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作者：Costa-Gomes, M; Zauner, KG
作者单位：University of York - UK; Harvard University; University of Vienna
摘要：We explain the main Features of the results of the four-country ultimatum bargaining experiments of Roth et al. (1991), Amer. Econom. Rev. 81, 1068-1095) by a social utility model. The specification of social utility of a player has two parts: a linear combination of the monetary payoffs of the proposer and the responder and payoff uncertainty. We find that, on average, responders have negative regard for proposers' earnings in all countries. Proposers have negative regard fur responders' mone...
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作者：Kalai, E
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作者：Calvo, E; Santos, JC
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Basque Country
摘要：We consider mixed cost allocation problems, i.e., joint cost problems that involve two types of heterogeneous outputs, divisible and indivisible. The Aumann-Shapley price mechanism is extended to this setting. We also present a set of properties which characterize this cost sharing rule. (C) 2001 Academic Press.
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作者：Parkes, DC; Huberman, BA
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We present a new multiagent model for the multiperiod portfolio selection problem. A system of cooperative agents divide initial wealth and follow individual worst-case optimal investment strategies from random portfolios, sharing their final profits and losses. The multiagent system achieves better average-case performance than a single agent with the same initial wealth in a simple stochastic market. A further increase in performance is achieved through communication of hints between agents ...
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作者：Sandholm, TW; Lesser, VR
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：In (automated) negotiation systems for self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. They do not accommodate future events. Contingency contracts address this, but are often impractical. As an alternative, we propose leveled commitment contracts. The level of commitment is set by breach penalties. To be freed from the contract, an agent simply pays the penalty to the other party. A self-interested agent will be reluctant to breach because the other party might breach, in w...
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作者：Anderson, SP; Goerce, JK; Holt, CA
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper revisits the minimum-effort coordination game with a continuum of Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Noise is introduced via a logit probabilistic choice function. The resulting logit equilibrium distribution of decisions is unique and maximizes a stochastic potential function. In the limit as the noise vanishes, the distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-dominant outcome for 2 x 2 games. In accordance with experimental evidence, logit equilibrium efforts dec...
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作者：Laslier, JF; Topol, R; Walliser, B
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This paper studies the cumulative proportional reinforcement (CPR) rule, according to which an agent plays, at each period, an action with a probability proportional to the cumulative utility that the agent has obtained with that action. The asymptotic properties of this learning process are examined for a decision-maker under risk, where it converges almost surely toward the expected utility maximizing action(s). The process is further considered in a two-player game; it converges with positi...
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作者：Bonanno, G
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：The logical foundations of game-theoretic solution concepts have so far been explored within the confines of epistemic logic. In this paper we turn to a different branch of modal logic, namely temporal logic, and propose to view the solution of a game as a complete prediction about future play. The branching time framework is extended by adding agents and by defining the notion of prediction. A syntactic characterization of backward induction in terms of the property of internal consistency of...
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作者：Monderer, D; Tennenholtz, M; Varian, H
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
