-
作者：Wärneryd, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are pe...
-
作者：Charness, G; Haruvy, E
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent theories of nonpecuniary motives can be classified as altruism-, equity-, or reciprocity-based. We outline the qualitative differences in prediction these alternative explanations yield in a gift-exchange game. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using. experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above t...
-
作者：Gossner, O; Vieille, N
作者单位：Universite Paris Nanterre; Universite Catholique Louvain; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We characterize the max min of repeated zero-sum games in which player one plays in pure strategies conditional on the private observation of a fixed sequence of random variables. Meanwhile we introduce a definition of a strategic distance between probability measures, and relate it to the standard Kullback distance. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
-
作者：Hamers, H; Klijn, F; Solymosi, T; Tijs, S; Villar, JP
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Universidade de Vigo; Budapest University of Technology & Economics; Corvinus University Budapest; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：A balanced game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are marginal vectors. In this note we prove that assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.
-
作者：Hart, S
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
-
作者：Bossert, W; Brams, SJ; Kilgour, DM
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; New York University; Wilfrid Laurier University
摘要：It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, over one round or n rounds. Representative solution concepts (Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium; two notions of core) are compared, and little agreement is found among them. Although it might be desirable to subsume these different solut...
-
作者：Volij, O
作者单位：Iowa State University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).
-
作者：Berninghaus, SK; Ehrhart, KM; Keser, C
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium, We examine how much local interaction structures affect players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods. Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in t...
-
作者：Faulí-Oller, R; Sandonís, J
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalt...
