Conventions and local interaction structures: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berninghaus, SK; Ehrhart, KM; Keser, C
• 署名单位: Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0897
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 177-205
• 关键词: Coordination games; Local interaction; Experimental economics

摘要

We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium, We examine how much local interaction structures affect players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods. Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in the long run, no effect on the players' strategy choices. Third, with the same neighborhood size, players allocated on a lattice tend less than players allocated around a circle to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. This is true even though the players are given exactly the same instructions. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).