Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hamers, H; Klijn, F; Solymosi, T; Tijs, S; Villar, JP
署名单位：
Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Universidade de Vigo; Budapest University of Technology & Economics; Corvinus University Budapest; Autonomous University of Barcelona
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.2001.0882
发表日期：
2002
页码：
231-239
关键词：
摘要：
A balanced game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are marginal vectors. In this note we prove that assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.
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