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作者：Wärneryd, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are pe...
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作者：Mattsson, LG; Weibull, JW
作者单位：Boston University; Royal Institute of Technology
摘要：We derive a family of probabilistic choice models, including the multinomial logit model, from a microecononic model in which the decision maker has to make some effort in order to implement any desired outcome. The disutility of this effort enters the decision maker's goal function in an additively separable way. A particular disutility function, yielding the multinomial logit as a special case, is characterized axiamatically. The present approach naturally leads to a normalization of the ach...
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作者：Charness, G; Haruvy, E
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent theories of nonpecuniary motives can be classified as altruism-, equity-, or reciprocity-based. We outline the qualitative differences in prediction these alternative explanations yield in a gift-exchange game. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using. experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above t...
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作者：Morgan, J; Sefton, M
作者单位：Princeton University; Princeton University; University of Nottingham
摘要：We investigate behavior in two unprofitable games-where Maxmin strategies do not form a Nash equilibrium yet guarantee the same payoff as Nash equilibrium strategies-that vary in the riskiness of the Nash strategy. We find that arguments for the implausibility of Nash equilibrium are confirmed by our experiments; however, claims that this will lead to Maxmin play are not. Neither solution concept accounts for more than 53% of choices in either game. The results indicate that the tension betwee...
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作者：Gossner, O; Vieille, N
作者单位：Universite Paris Nanterre; Universite Catholique Louvain; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We characterize the max min of repeated zero-sum games in which player one plays in pure strategies conditional on the private observation of a fixed sequence of random variables. Meanwhile we introduce a definition of a strategic distance between probability measures, and relate it to the standard Kullback distance. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Duffy, J; Feltovich, N
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：This paper reports results from an experiment designed to compare cheap talk and observation of past actions. We consider three games and explain why cheap talk or observation is likely to be more effective for achieving good outcomes in each game. We find that both cheap talk and observation make cooperation and coordination more likely and increase payoffs, relative to our control treatment. The relative success of cheap talk versus observation depends on the game, in accordance with our pre...
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作者：Hamers, H; Klijn, F; Solymosi, T; Tijs, S; Villar, JP
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Universidade de Vigo; Budapest University of Technology & Economics; Corvinus University Budapest; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：A balanced game satisfies the CoMa-property if and only if the extreme points of its core are marginal vectors. In this note we prove that assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.
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作者：Greenberg, J; Luo, X; Oladi, R; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：McGill University; National Taiwan University; University System of Ohio; University of Dayton; University of Haifa
摘要：Within the framework of (pure) exchange economies, we demonstrate that the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set in the allocation space may differ from that in the corresponding utility space. Following Harsanyi (1974. Management Sci. 20, 1472-1495). we then define the notion of the sophisticated stable set and establish an equivalence theorem: like the core, the sophisticated stable set in the allocation space coincides with that in the utility space. We also show that the sophisticated sta...
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作者：Ryan, MJ
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：Belief persistence is a standard rationality axiom in formal models of belief change. It requires that new information be accommodated with the smallest possible change to existing beliefs. This note shows that violations of belief persistence are possible in J. Eichberger and D. Kelsey's (1999a, Signalling Games with Uncertainty, unpublished. University of Birmingham; 1999b, in Beliefs, Interactions and Preferences in Decision Waking (M. J. Machina and B. Munier, Eds.), pp. 135-157, Dordrecht...
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作者：Hart, S
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
