Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bossert, W; Brams, SJ; Kilgour, DM
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; New York University; Wilfrid Laurier University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00004-0
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 185-202
• 关键词: truel; Nash equilibrium; core

摘要

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, over one round or n rounds. Representative solution concepts (Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium; two notions of core) are compared, and little agreement is found among them. Although it might be desirable to subsume these different solutions within a common framework, such unification seems unlikely since they are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.