In Defense of DEFECT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Volij, O
• 署名单位: Iowa State University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1006/game.2001.0893
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 309-321
• 关键词: automata; complexity; prisoner's dilemma

摘要

The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners' dilemma, when preferences are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strategy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a uniformly bounded complexity. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).