Welfare reducing licensing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Faulí-Oller, R; Sandonís, J
• 署名单位: Universitat d'Alacant; University of Basque Country
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00513-4
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 192-205
• 关键词: two-part tariff contracts; Patent licensing

摘要

In this paper, we characterize situations where licensing a cost reducing innovation to a rival firm using two-part tariff contracts (a fixed fee plus a linear per unit of output royalty) reduces social welfare. We show that it occurs if (i) the firms compete in prices, (ii) the innovation is large enough but not drastic, and (iii) the goods are close enough substitutes. Moreover, we show that, regardless of the type of competition, first, the optimal contract always includes a positive royalty and, second, even drastic innovations are licensed whenever the goods are not homogeneous. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.