Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hart, S
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00502-X
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 227-264
• 关键词: games in extensive form; games of perfect information; backward induction equilibrium; subgame-perfect equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics; evolutionary stability; Mutation; selection; Population games

摘要

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.