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作者：Blume, A; Arnold, T
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University Hohenheim
摘要：We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive ali...
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作者：Dutta, B; Kar, A
作者单位：University of Warwick; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfies cost monotonicity. We also give characterisation theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between these two rules is in terms of their consistency properties. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hain, R; Mitra, M
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute
摘要：In this paper we analyze simple sequencing problems under incomplete information and interdependent costs. We prove the necessity of concave cost function for implementability of such problems. Implementability means that one can achieve aggregate cost minimization in expost equilibrium. We also show that simple sequencing problems are implementable if and only if the mechanism is a 'generalized VCG mechanism.' We then consider first best implementability, that is implementability with budget ...
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作者：Dufwenberg, M; Kirchsteiger, G
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Arizona
摘要：Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution ...
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作者：Blume, A; Arnold, T
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University Hohenheim
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作者：Tennenholtz, M
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：In a computerized setting, players' strategies can be implemented by computer programs, to be executed on a shared computational devise. This situation becomes typical to new Internet economies, where agent technologies play a major role. This allows the definition of a program equilibrium. Following the fundamental ideas introduced by von Neumann in the 1940s (in parallel to his seminal contribution to game theory), a computer program can be used both as a set of instructions, as well as a fi...
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作者：Amorós, P
作者单位：Universidad de Malaga
摘要：We study Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use. We characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function, and show the importance of allowing the planner to sometimes take away resources from the agents. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Echenique, F
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice-in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out-surpris...
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作者：Di Tillio, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Lehrer and Sorin (1997, Games Econ. Behav. 20, 131-148) use a one-shot public mediated talk model to show that, given any probability distribution on the outcomes of a finite normal-form game, there exists a public mediated talk mechanism that simulates that distribution, provided the probabilities on outcomes are rational numbers. It is shown here that a minor amendment of the very same model allows a much stronger conclusion: any distribution on the outcomes, whether the probabilities are ra...
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作者：Albizuri, MJ; Zarzuelo, JM
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper we propose a characterization of the coalitional value for transferable utility games (Owen, 1977), and we define and study coalitional semivalues, which are generalizations of semivalues (Dubey, Neyman and Weber, 198 1). (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
