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作者：Pápai, S
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：We investigate the uniqueness of stable coalition structures in a simple coalition formation model, for which specific coalition formation games, such as the marriage and roommate models, are special cases that are obtained by restricting the coalitions that may form. The main result is a characterization of collections of permissible coalitions which ensure that there is a unique stable coalition structure in the corresponding coalition formation model. In particular, we show that only single...
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作者：Friedman, E; Shor, M; Shenker, S; Sopher, B
作者单位：Cornell University; Vanderbilt University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We present the results of an experiment on learning in a continuous-time low-information setting. For a dominance solvable version of a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated products, we find little evidence of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In an asynchronous setting, characterized by players updating their strategies at different frequencies, play tends toward the Stackelberg outcome which favors the slower player. Convergence is significantly more robust for a serial cost sharing game...
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作者：Morris, S; Ui, T
作者单位：Yale University; Yokohama National University
摘要：Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some potential game arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equiva...
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作者：Roughgarden, T; Tardos, É
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Equilibria in noncooperative games are typically inefficient, as illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma. In this paper, we quantify this inefficiency by comparing the payoffs of equilibria to the payoffs of a best possible outcome. We study a nonatomic version of the congestion games defined by Rosenthal [Int. J. Game Theory 2 (1973) 65], and identify games in which equilibria are approximately optimal in the sense that no other outcome achieves a significantly larger total payoff to the player...
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作者：Cox, JC
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper uses a three-games (or triadic) design to identify trusting and reciprocating behavior. A large literature on single-game trust and reciprocity experiments is based on the implicit assumption that subjects do not have altruistic or inequality-averse other-regarding preferences. Such experimental designs test compound hypotheses that include the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences do not affect behavior. In contrast, experiments with the triadic design do discriminate between...
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作者：Dubey, P; Haimanko, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：For extensive form games with perfect information, consider a learning process in which, at any iteration, each player unilaterally deviates to a best response to his current conjectures of others' strategies; and then updates his conjectures in accordance with the induced play of the game. We show that, for generic payoffs, the outcome of the game becomes stationary, and is consistent with Nash equilibrium. In general, if payoffs have ties or if players observe more of each others' strategies...
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作者：Muthoo, A
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper studies the origins of one of the most basic of property rights, namely, the right of an individual or an organization to the fruits of its labour. My objective is to address the questions of why, when and how this property right can emerge and be made secure. I develop a model of the strategic interaction between two players in the state-of-nature, which is an environment characterized by the absence of any laws and institutions (including property rights and the state). My analysi...
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作者：Echenique, F
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：I characterize games for which there is an order on strategies such that the game has strategic complementarities. I prove that, with some qualifications, games with a unique equilibrium have complementarities if and only if Cournot best-response dynamics has no cycles; and that all games with multiple equilibria have complementarities. As applications of my results, I show that: (1) generic 2 x 2 games either have no pure-strategy equilibria, or have complementarities; (2) generic two-player ...
