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作者：Ju, BG
作者单位：University of Kansas
摘要：We consider risk sharing problems with a single good and a finite number of states. Agents have a common prior and their preferences are represented in the expected utility form and are risk averse. We study efficient and individually rational risk sharing rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the requirement that no one can ever benefit by misrepresenting his preference. When aggregate certainty holds, we show that fixed price selections from Walrasian correspondence are the only rules satisfy...
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作者：Mailath, GJ; Postlewaite, A; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within epsilon of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect epsilon-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure e...
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作者：Goeree, JK; Holt, CA
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Virginia
摘要：This paper reports data for coordination game experiments with random matching. The experimental design is based on changes in an effort-cost parameter, which do not alter the set of Nash equilibria nor do they alter the predictions of adjustment theories based on imitation or best response dynamics. As expected, however, increasing the effort cost lowers effort levels. Maximization of a stochastic potential function, a concept that generalizes risk dominance to continuous games, predicts this...
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作者：Samet, D; Safra, Z
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：A solution to bargaining problems is ordinal when it is covariant with respect to order-preserving transformations of utility. Shapley has constructed an ordinal, symmetric, efficient solution to three-player problems. Here, we extend Shapley's solution in two directions. First, we extend it to more than three players. Second, we show that this extension lends itself to the construction of a continuum of ordinal, symmetric, efficient solutions. The construction makes use of ordinal path-valued...
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作者：Hofbauer, J; Hopkins, E
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of London; University College London
摘要：We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2-person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (resealed) partnership games, also known as potential games. Lastly, mixed equilibria o...
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作者：Harris, CJ; Stinchcombe, MB; Zame, WR
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of London; King's College London
摘要：Normal form games are nearly compact and continuous (NCC) if they can be understood as games played on strategy spaces that are dense subsets of the strategy spaces of larger compact games, with jointly continuous payoffs. There are intrinsic algebraic, measure theoretic, functional analysis, and finite approximability characterizations of NCC games. NCC games have finitely additive equilibria, and all their finitely additive equilibria are equivalent to countably additive equilibria on metric...
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作者：Rustichini, A; Dickhaut, J; Ghirardato, P; Smith, K; Pardo, JV
作者单位：University of Turin; University of Turin; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Kansas State University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; US Department of Veterans Affairs; Veterans Health Administration (VHA); Minneapolis VA Health Care System
摘要：We study the behavior of subjects facing choices between certain, risky, and ambiguous lotteries. Subjects' choices are consistent with the economic theories modeling ambiguity aversion. Our results support the conjecture that subjects face choice tasks as an estimation of the value of the lotteries, and that the difficulty of the choice is an important explanatory variable (in addition to risk and ambiguity aversion). The brain imaging data suggest that such estimation is of an approximate na...
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作者：Samet, D
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作者：Yi, KO
作者单位：Sogang University
摘要：This paper investigates the implications of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Games Econ. Behav. 10, 6-38; 1998, Exper. Econ. 1, 9-41] in the ultimatum bargaining game. It is shown that, in a normal-form QRE (NQRE), each bargainer's decision depends critically on the anticipated behavior of the other, and there is a NQRE in which the proposer makes any offer between zero and equal split as a strict best response. The application of NQRE to the experimental ...
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作者：Bechara, A; Damasio, AR
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：Modem economic theory ignores the influence of emotions on decision-making. Emerging neuroscience evidence suggests that sound and rational decision making, in fact, depends on prior accurate emotional processing. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and its influence by emotion. The key idea of this hypothesis is that decision-making is a process that is influenced by marker signals that arise in bioregulatory proce...
