-
作者：Rustichini, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
-
作者：Aramendía, M; Larrea, C; Ruiz, L
作者单位：University of Basque Country
摘要：We explore a new concept of renegotiation proofness in the symmetric repeated Cournot model with several players. We show that this concept significantly limits the cooperative outcomes that can be sustained in equilibrium. In particular, the symmetric monopoly outcome cannot be sustained when the number of players is high enough (9 in the case of the linear demand function). When the number of players tends to infinity, (i) the collusive benefits that could be sustained are at most four times...
-
作者：van den Brink, R; van der Laan, G
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：A value function for cooperative games with transferable utility is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of the payoffs over the players. An alternative type of solutions are share functions which assign to every player its share in the payoffs to be distributed. In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the players are organized into an a priori coalition structure being a finite partition of the player set. We introduce a general method for defining share f...
-
作者：Hildenbrand, W; Kneip, A
作者单位：University of Bonn; Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz
摘要：It is shown how one can effectively use microdata in modelling the change over time in an aggregate (e.g. mean consumption expenditure) of a large and heterogeneous population. The starting point of our aggregation analysis is a specification of explanatory variables on the micro-level. Typically, some of these explanatory variables are observable and others are unobservable. Based on certain hypotheses on the evolution over time of the joint distributions across the population of these explan...
-
作者：Casella, A
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use; the decision is then taken according to the majority of votes cast. The possibility of shifting votes intertemporally allows agents to concentrate their votes when preferences are more intense, and alt...
-
作者：Hokari, T
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：Many solutions for TU-games coincide with the standard solution for the two-agent case. We study its weighted generalizations. In particular, we study whether max consistency is compatible with 2-weighted-standardness. We show that on the domain of all TU-games, efficiency, 2-weighted-standardness, and max consistency jointly imply equal treatment of equals. It follows from this result that on the same domain, the prenucleolus is the only single-valued solution satisfying efficiency, 2-weighte...
-
作者：Goyal, S; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Essex; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally investing in costly pairwise links. In this context, individual efforts to balance the costs and benefits of links are shown to lead to a unique equilibrium interaction architecture. The dynamics of network f...
-
作者：Fréchette, GR; Kagel, JH; Morelli, M
作者单位：New York University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We compare Gamson's Law, a popular empirical model of legislative bargaining, with two noncooperative bargaining models in three players divide the dollar games in which no player has enough votes to form a winning coalition on their own. Both of the game theoretic models better organize the comparative static data resulting from changes in nominal bargaining power than does Gamson's Law. We also identify deviations from the point predictions of the non-cooperative bargaining models. Namely, p...
-
作者：Meirowitz, A
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We investigate the incentives faced by poll respondents when candidates use polling data to inform their selection of policy platforms. Focusing on models with a unidimensional policy space, single peaked preferences and two office-seeking candidates observing a summary statistic from polls that ask respondents their preferences, we find that for most environments honest poll response cannot occur in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. However, simple partially-revealing equilibria exist when the ...
-
作者：Knutson, B; Peterson, R
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：While the concept of expected utility informs many theories of decision making, little is known about whether and how the human brain might compute this quantity. This article reviews a series of functional magnetic resonance imaging (FMRI) experiments designed to localize brain regions that respond in anticipation of increasing amounts of monetary incentives. These studies collectively suggest that anticipation of increasing monetary gains activates a subcortical region of the ventral striatu...
