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作者：Okada, A; Riedl, A
作者单位：Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper experimentally investigates the impact of reciprocal behavior in multilateral bargaining and coalition formation. Our results show that reciprocal fairness strongly affects the efficiency and equity of coalition formation. In a large majority of cases, inefficient and unfair coalitions are chosen when their coalition values are relatively high. Up to one third of the experimental population is excluded from bargaining and earns nothing. In monetary terms economically significant eff...
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作者：Duffy, J; Hopkins, E
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Previous data from experiments on market entry games, N-player games where each player faces a choice between entering a market and staying out, appear inconsistent with either mixed or pure Nash equilibria. Here we show that, in this class of game, learning theory predicts sorting, that is, in the long run, agents play a pure strategy equilibrium with some agents permanently in the market, and some permanently out. We conduct experiments with a larger number of repetitions than in previous wo...
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作者：Thomson, W
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We construct simple games implementing in Nash equilibria several solutions to the problem of fair division. These solutions are the no-envy solution, which selects the allocations such that no agent would prefer someone else's bundle to his own. and several variants of this solution, Components of strategies can be interpreted as allocations, consumption bundles, permutations, points in simplices of dimensionalities equal to the number of goods or to the number of agents, and integers, We als...
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作者：Battaglini, M
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J. Polit. Economy 108, 34-55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the proper-ties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbi...
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作者：Stinchcombe, MB
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Infinite normal form games that are mathematically simple have been treated [ Harris, C.J., Stinch-combe, M.B., Zame, W.R., in press. Nearly compact and continuous normal form games: characterizations and equilibrium existence. Games Econ. Behav.]. Under study in this paper are the other infinite normal form games, a class that includes the normal forms of most extensive form games with infinite choice sets. Finitistic equilibria are the limits of approximate equilibria taken along generalized...
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作者：Chun, Y; Thomson, W
作者单位：University of Rochester; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study the behavior of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims when there is a large number of claimants with small claims. We model such situations by replicating some basic problem. We show that under replication, the random arrival rule [Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982) 345] behave's like the proportional rule. the rule that is the most often recommended in this context. Also. under replication, the minimal overlap rule [Math. Soc. Sci. 2 (1982) 345] behaves like the constrained equal lo...
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作者：McLean, R; Postlewaite, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We analyze the ex ante incentive compatible core for replicated private information economics. We show that any allocation in the core when the economy is replicated sufficiently often is approximately Walrasian for the associated Arrow-Debreu economy. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Orzach, R; Tauman, Y
作者单位：Wayne State University; Tulane University; Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：Following Spence, this note provides an education signaling model to explain the phenomenon of gifted entrepreneurs who acquire less education than ordinary individuals. Two types of individuals, ordinary and gifted, are considered. Each one of them can either convince an investor to fund his enterprise or approach a competitive job market. The probability that an ordinary individual succeeds to establish a successful enterprise is smaller than that of a gifted individual irrespective of his e...
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作者：Hopkins, E; Posch, M
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Medical University of Vienna
摘要：This paper investigates the properties of the most common form of reinforcement learning (the basic model of Erev and Roth) [Amer. Econ. Rev. 88 (1998) 848-881]. Stochastic approximation theory has been used to analyse the local stability of fixed points under this learning process. However, as we show, when such points are on the boundary of the state space, for example, pure strategy equilibria, standard results from the theory of stochastic approximation do not apply. We offer what we belie...
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作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A unified framework is developed for representation of, and reasoning about dynamic games. A game is described by the subjective knowledge of players at hypothetical situations-the epistemic game form. Subjective knowledge-termed confidence-allows us to replace objective reasoning about hypothetical events with reasoning about the confidence of hypothetical identities, i.e., the subjective reasoning of players in hypothetical situations. This leads to an endogenous definition for players* acti...
