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作者：Renault, J; Scarlatti, S; Scarsini, M
作者单位：University of Turin; G d'Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We study a particular case of repeated games with public signals. In the stage game an odd number of players have to choose simultaneously one of two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room receive a reward of one euro (whence the name minority game). The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced. We show that in the infinitely repeated game any feasible payoff can be achieved as a uniform equil...
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作者：Dubey, P; Einy, E; Haimanko, O
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity requires that no voter has negative power, and at least one has positive power. Transfer requires that, when winning coalitions are enhanced in a game, the change in voting power depends only on the change in the game, i.e., on the set of new winning coalitions. The most crucial axiom is composition: the value of a player in a compound voting game is the product of his power in the relevant fir...
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作者：Takahashi, S
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster...
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作者：Asheim, GB; Perea, A
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Oslo
摘要：Within an epistemic model for two-player extensive games, we formalize the event that each player believes that his opponent chooses rationally at all information sets. Letting this event be common certain belief yields the concept of sequential rationalizability Adding preference for cautious behavior to this event likewise yields the concept of quasi-perfect rationalizability. These concepts are shown to (a) imply backward induction in generic perfect information games, and (b) be non-equili...
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作者：de Clippel, G
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Myerson's [Cooperative games with incomplete information. Int. J. Game Theory 13 (1984) 6996] extension of the lambda-transfer value to cooperative games with incomplete information focuses among other things on the strength of the incentive constraints at the solution for determining the power of coalitions. We construct an intuitive three-player game where the player whose only contribution is to partly release the two other players from the incentive constraints they face when they cooperat...
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作者：Karni, E; Postlewaite, A
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作者：Smith, K; Dickhaut, J
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Linkoping University
摘要：In two different types of institutions, English and Dutch auctions, we collect heart rate data, a proxy for emotion, to test hypotheses based on findings in neural science about the effect of emotion on economic behavior. We first demonstrate that recording heart rates does not distort prices in these auctions. Next we ask if knowledge of the intensity of a participant's emotional state improves our ability to predict price setting behavior beyond predictions of price based on usual economic v...
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作者：Feinberg, Y
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The subjective framework is used to characterize the reasoning leading to an equilibrium refinement based on sequential rationality and Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. Equilibria based on sequential rationality require different reasoning on and off the equilibrium path for such solutions to emerge, or need arbitrary rules for reasoning depending on which game is played, We suggest a solution concept termed the reasonable solution based on maximization of confidence in rationality, equal tr...
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作者：Bhatt, M; Camerer, CF
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：Sixteen subjects' brain activity were scanned using fMRI as they made choices, expressed beliefs, and expressed iterated 2nd-order beliefs (what they think others believe they will do) in eight games. Cingulate cortex and prefrontal areas (active in theory of mind and social reasoning) are differentially activated in making choices versus expressing beliefs. Forming self-referential 2nd-order beliefs about what others think you will do seems to be a mixture of processes used to make choices an...
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作者：Ellingsen, T; Johannesson, M
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study a bilateral trading relationship in which one agent. the seller, can make a nonrecoverable investment in order to generate potential gains from trade. Afterwards, the seller makes a price offer that the buyer can either accept or reject. If agents are fairminded. sellers who are known by the buyer to have high investment costs are predicted to charge higher prices. If the investment cost is private information, low-cost sellers should price more aggressively and high-cost sellers less...
