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作者：van Damme, Eric; Muller, Rudolf; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Tilburg University; Hasselt University; Maastricht University; Northwestern University
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作者：Sandholm, Tuomas; Suri, Subhash
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：In most real-world (electronic) marketplaces, there are additional considerations besides maximizing immediate economic value. We present a sound way of taking such considerations into account via side constraints and non-price attributes, and show that side constraints (such as budget, limit on the number of winners, and exclusive-or) have a significant impact on the complexity of market clearing. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lehmann, Benny; Lehmann, Daniel; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：in most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations Of Such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of valuations that exhibit no complementarities, a hierarchy that includes also OR and XOR combinations of singleton valuations, and valuations satisfying the gross substitutes property. Those last valuations are shown to form a zero-measure subset of the submodular ...
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作者：Johari, Ramesh; Mannor, Shie; Tsitsiklis, John N.
作者单位：Stanford University; McGill University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We consider a network game where the nodes of the network wish to form a graph to route traffic between themselves. We present a model where costs are incurred for routing traffic, as well as for a lack of network connectivity. We focus on directed links and the link stability equilibrium concept, and characterize connected link stable equilibria. The structure of connected link stable networks is analyzed for several special cases. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lenzo, Justin; Sarver, Todd
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of multiple subpopulations. We establish that correlated equilibrium is a natural solution concept in this setting. Specifically, we show that every correlated equilibrium is equivalent to a stationary state in the replicator dynamics of some subpopulation model. We also show that every interior stationary state, Lyapunov stable state, or limit of an interior solution is equivalent to a correlated...
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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Dubra, Juan
作者单位：Universidad de Montevideo; New York University
摘要：Auction theory has emphasized the importance of private information to the profits of bidders. However, the theory has failed to consider to what extent initially private information will remain private. We show that in a variety of contexts bidders will reveal their information, even if this information revelation is (ex ante) detrimental to them. Similarly, a seller may reveal her information although this revelation lowers revenues. We also show that bidders may be harmed by private informa...
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作者：Chong, Juin-Kuan; Camerer, Colin F.; Ho, Teck H.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU); National University of Singapore; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper tests a learning-based model of strategic teaching in repeated games with incomplete information. The repeated game has a long-run player whose type is unknown to a group of shortrun players. The proposed model assumes a fraction of 'short-run' players follow a one-parameter learning model (self-tuning EWA). In addition, some 'long-run' players are myopic while others are sophisticated and rationally anticipate how short-run players adjust their actions over time and teach the short...
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作者：Falk, A; Fischbacher, U
作者单位：University of Zurich; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Bonn; University of Zurich
摘要：People are reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. In this paper we present a formal theory of reciprocity. It takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by its underlying intention. The theory is in line with the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental games, such as the ultimatum game, the gift-exchange game, a reduced best-shot game, the dictator game, the prisoner's dilemma, and public goods...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Hasselt University; Maastricht University
摘要：We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All ...
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作者：Chambers, CP
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We introduce a general class of rules for claims problems, called the difference rules, and demonstrate that a rule satisfies composition down and composition up if and only if it is a difference rule. We show that these rules are very simple to describe when there are two agents. In a variable population framework, we introduce a family of rules satisfying consistency, composition down, and composition up, which we term the logarithmic-proportional rules. These rules satisfy neither symmetry ...
