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作者：Ui, Takashi
作者单位：Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Chambers, CP; Hayashi, T
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：Following Mongin [J. Econ. Theory 66 (1995) 313; J. Math. Econ. 29 (1998) 33 1], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Leslie, David S.; Collins, E. J.
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Oxford
摘要：A general class of adaptive processes in games is developed, which significantly generalises weakened fictitious play [Van der Genugten, B., 2000. A weakened form of fictitious play in two-person zero-sum games. Int. Game Theory Rev. 2, 307-328] and includes several interesting fictitious-play-like processes as special cases. The general model is rigorously analysed using the best response differential inclusion, and shown to converge in games with the fictitious play property. Furthermore, a ...
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作者：Dindos, M; Mezzetti, C
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Brown University
摘要：We consider n-person games with quasi-concave payoffs that depend on a player's own action and the sum of all players' actions. We show that a discrete-time, stochastic process in which players move towards better replies-the better-reply dynamics-converges globally to a Nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each Nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic, adjusted best-reply dynamics. We present a...
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作者：Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：In this paper, we use p-best response sets-a. set-valued extension of p-dominance-in order to provide a new sufficient condition for the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information: if there exists a set S which is a p-best response set with Sigma(I)(i) (= 1) p(i) < 1, and there exists a unique correlated equilibrium mu* whose support is in S then mu* is a robust Nash equilibrium. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Faure-Grimaud, A; Reiche, S
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper shows that the inability of principals to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when dealing with several agents whose private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamics of contracting without such correlation. The paper also explores what limitations on yardstick mechanisms can justify the use of long-term contracts. We found that the inability of a principal to commit not to renegotiate long-term contracts is without consequence even if there is a bo...
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作者：Kocher, Martin; Strauss, Sabine; Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：Max Planck Society; University of Innsbruck; University of Cologne
摘要：Even though decision-making in small teams is pervasive in business and private life, little is known about subjects' preferences with respect to individual and team decision-making and about the consequences of respecting these preferences. We report the results from an experimental beauty-contest game where subjects could endogenously choose their preferred way of decision-making. About 60% of them preferred to decide in a team, and teams won the game significantly more often than individual...
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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We show that an ascending price auction for multiple units of a homogeneous object proposed by Ausubel (i) raises prices for packages until they reach those nonlinear and non-anonymous market clearing prices at which bidders get their marginal products and (ii) the auction is a primal-dual algorithm applied to an appropriate linear programming formulation in which the dual solution yields those same market clearing prices. We emphasize the similarities with efficient incentive compatible ascen...
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作者：Galeotti, A; Goyal, S; Kamphorst, J
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Llerena, F; Rafels, C
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of a specific class of the convex games: the almost positive games. These games have non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above result we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All ...
