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作者：Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Amsterdam
摘要：Bertrand competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy Nash equilibrium prices. We first present results of experiments in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. More firms lead to lower average prices. However, prices remain substantially above the Walrasian level. With more than two firms the predominant market price is 24, a price not predicted by conventional equilibrium theories. This phenomenon can be captured b...
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作者：Fishman, Michael A.
摘要：In this paper, I extend the analytical framework of evolutionary game theory to games with two distinct types of players where the type-specific payoff functions are nonlinear on the right-bi-player-type nonlinear (BNL) evolutionary games. That is, asymmetric games where the payoffs for pairwise interactions are influenced by the ambient frequencies of the pertinent strategies of both types of players. While this paper is motivated by my interest in inter- and intra-gender conflicts of interes...
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作者：Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：I consider a version of the chain store game where the incumbent firm's type evolves according to a Markov process with two states: a tough type who always fights entry, and a weak type who prefers to accommodate. There exists a minimal level of persistence necessary for the incumbent to be able to sustain any reputation for being tough. Above that level, as the number of markets T increases, in equilibrium play alternates between intervals of entry by competitors and intervals of deterrence. ...
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作者：Chioveanu, Ioana
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：I consider an oligopoly model where, prior to price competition, firms invest in persuasive advertising and induce brand loyalty ill consumers who Would otherwise buy the cheapest alternative oil the market. This setting in which persuasive advertising is introduced to homogeneous product markets. provides an alternative explanation for price dispersion phenomena. Despite ex ante symmetry, the equilibrium profile of advertising Outlays is asymmetric. It follows that endogenously determined bra...
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作者：Maenner, Eliot
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：The paper presents a learning model for two-player infinitely repeated games. In an inference step players construct minimally complex inferences of strategies based on observed play, and in an adaptation step players choose minimally complex best responses to an inference. When players randomly select an inference from a probability distribution with full support the set of steady states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in which only stage game Nash equilibria are played. When player...
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作者：Dawid, Herbert; MacLeod, W. Bentley
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University; University of Bielefeld; University of Bielefeld
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of bargaining norms in a simple production problem with two-sided relationship specific investments and competition. The puzzle we wish to address is why efficient bargaining norms do not evolve even though there exist efficient sequential equilibria. Conditions under which stochastically stable bargaining conventions exist are characterized, and it is shown that there is a hierarchy of norms, with a stochastically stable division rule that...
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作者：Lopez-Perez, Raul
作者单位：Autonomous University of Madrid
摘要：In experimental games, we observe the following phenomena: (1) Many subjects cooperate Contrary to their material interest, (2) they cooperate in a reciprocal manner, (3) Subjects often punish those others who behave Unkindly, and (4) previous history usually influences subjects' choices. We propose a simple game-theoretical model to account for these and other experimental phenomena, and compare it with other models of social preferences and reciprocity. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights rese...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil I.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper introduces discrete large games where the set of players is a countable dense 'grid' with a finitely additive distribution. In these games an), function from player names to mixed actions is a legitimate strategy profile. No extraneous continuity or measurability conditions are assumed. Randomness can be modeled explicitly and ail exact law of large numbers holds. Equilibria enjoy a strong purification property: every realization of every mixed strategy equilibrium is a pure strateg...
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作者：Pawlowitsch, Christina
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：This paper gives a complete characterization of neutrally stable strategies for sender-receiver games in the style of Lewis, or Nowak and Krakauer [Lewis, D., 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA; Nowak, M., Krakauer, D., 1999. The evolution of language. Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 96, 8028-8033]. Due to the dynamic implications of neutral stability, the replicator dynamics of this model does not necessarily lead to the rise of an optimal signaling system, ...
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作者：van Velzen, Bas; Hamers, Herbert; Solymosi, Tamas
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：Chain-component additive games are graph-restricted superadditive games, where an exogenously given chain determines the cooperative possibilities of the players. These games can model various multi-agent decision situations, such as strictly hierarchical organisations or sequencing/scheduling related problems, where an order of the agents is fixed by some external factor, and with respect to this order only consecutive coalitions can generate added value. In this paper we characterise core st...
