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作者：Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio; Sanchez-Rodriguez, Estela
作者单位：Northwestern University; Universidade de Vigo; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：We follow the path initiated by Shapley in 1971 and study the geometry of the core of convex and strictly convex games. We define what we call face games and use them to study the combinatorial complexity of the core of a strictly convex game. Remarkably, we present a picture that summarizes our results with the aid of Pascal's triangle. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Chang, Chih; Hu, Cheng-Cheng
作者单位：Southern Taiwan University of Science & Technology; National Tsing Hua University
摘要：First, we propose an axiomatic characterization of the f-just rules. Second, based on the result, a game is designed and a non-cooperative interpretation of the f-just rules is provided. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Simonsohn, Uri; Karlsson, Niklas; Loewenstein, George; Ariely, Dan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Gothenburg; Carnegie Mellon University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Standard economic models assume that the weight given to information from different sources depends exclusively on its diagnosticity. In this paper we study whether the same piece of information is weighted more heavily simply because it arose from direct experience rather than from observation. We investigate this possibility by conducting repeated game experiments in which groups of players are randomly rematched on every round and receive feedback about the actions and outcomes of all playe...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf
作者单位：Maastricht University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：In this paper we study cooperative games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected cycle-free communication graph. Players in the game can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the graph. We introduce a new single-valued solution concept, the average tree solution. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency and component fairness. The interpretation of component fairness is that deleting a link between two players yields for both resulting compone...
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作者：Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which dec...
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作者：Tchantcho, Bertrand; Lambo, Lawrence Diffo; Pongou, Roland; Engoulou, Bertrand Mbama
作者单位：Brown University; University of Yaounde I
摘要：The influence relation was introduced by Isbell [Isbell, J.R.. 1958. A class of simple games. Duke Math.. 25, 423-439] to qualitatively compare the a priori influence of voters in a simple game, which by construction allows only yes and no votes. We extend this relation to voting games with abstention (VGAs), in which abstention is permitted as an intermediate option between a yes and a no vote. Unlike in simple games, this relation is not a preorder in VGAs in general. It is not complete eith...
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作者：Guerdjikova, Ani
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：The paper applies the rule for adaptation of the aspiration level suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler to a situation in which the similarity between acts is represented by an arbitrary similarity function [Gilboa, I., Schmeidler, D., 1996. Case-based optimization. Games Econ. Behav. 15, 1-26]. I show that the optimality result derived by Gilboa and Schmeidler in general fails. With a concave similarity function, only corner acts are chosen in the limit. The optimality result can tie reestablish...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Ren; Overgaard, Per Baltzer
作者单位：Aarhus University; Brock University
摘要：We consider first-price and second-price auctions with asymmetric buyers, and examine whether pre-auction offers to a subset of buyers are profitable. A single offer is never profitable prior to a second-price auction, but may be profitable prior to a first-price auction. However, a sequence of offers is profitable in either type of auction. In our model, suitably chosen pre-auction offers work because they move the assignment when bidder valuations are near the top closer to the optimal, reve...
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作者：Sparrow, Colin; van Strien, Sebastian; Harris, Christopher
作者单位：University of Warwick
摘要：In the 1960s Shapley provided an example of a two-player fictitious game with periodic behaviour. In this game, player A aims to copy B's behaviour and player B aims to play one ahead of player A. In this paper we generalise Shapley's example by introducing an external parameter. We show that the periodic behaviour in Shapley's example at some critical parameter value disintegrates into unpredictable (chaotic) behaviour, with players dithering a huge number of times between different strategie...
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作者：Azacis, Helmuts
作者单位：Cardiff University
摘要：I consider the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash an...
