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作者：Conitzer, Vincent; Sandholm, Tuomas
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We provide a single reduction that demonstrates that in normal-form games: (1) it is NP-complete to determine whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties exist (these results are similar to those obtained by Gilboa and Zemel [Gilboa, I., Zemel, E., 1989. Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations. Games Econ. Behav. 1, 80-931), (2) more significantly, the problems of maximizing certain properties of a Nash equilibrium are inapproximable (unless P = NP), and (3) ...
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作者：Galbiati, Roberto; Vertova, Pietro
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Insubria; University of Bergamo
摘要：Laws express rules of conduct ('obligations') enforced by the means of penalties and rewards ('incentives'). The role of incentives in shaping individual behaviour has been largely analysed in the traditional economic literature. On the contrary, very little is known about the specific role of obligations. In this paper we test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in a public good game. The results show that. for given marginal incentives, different levels of m...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者：Correa, Jose R.; Schulz, Andreas S.; Stier-Moses, Nicolas E.
作者单位：Columbia University; Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We present a short. geometric proof for the price-of-anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks and on nonatomic congestion games. This novel proof also facilitates two new types of theoretical results: On the one hand, we give pseudo-approximation results that depend on the class of allowable cost functions. On tire other hand, we derive stronger bounds on the inefficiency of equilibria for situations in which t...
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作者：Kagel, John; Pevnitskaya, Svetlana; Ye, Lixin
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. Furthermore, there exist alternative bid procedures that, in theory at least, guarantee 100% efficiency and higher revenue for the seller. We employ experiments to compare actual performance between ...
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作者：Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs
作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Bonn; University of Zurich
摘要：Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. One of the most controversial and yet unresolved issues in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an important role in economic relations, political struggles, and legal disputes but there is surprisingly little direct evidence for its behavioral importance. We provide experimental evidence for t...
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作者：Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Timothy C.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price scaled bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between th...
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作者：Devetag, Giovanna; Warglien, Massimo
作者单位：University of Perugia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：It has been suggested that players often produce simplified and/or misspecified mental models of strategic decisions [Kreps, D., 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford]. We submit that the relational structure of players' preferences in a game is a source of cognitive complexity, and may be an important driver of such simplifications. We provide a classification of order structures in two-person games based on the properties of monotonicity, and projectivity, and p...
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Rego, Leandro Chaves
作者单位：Universidade Federal de Pernambuco; Cornell University
摘要：We analyze a model of interactive unawareness introduced by Heifetz, Meier and Schipper. We consider two axiomatizations for their model, which capture different notions of validity. These axiomatizations allow us to compare the Heifetz et al. approach to both the standard (S5) epistemic logic and two other approaches to unawareness: that of Fagin and Halpern and that of Modica and Rustichini. We show that the differences between the Heifetz et al. approach and the others are mainly due to the...
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作者：Potters, Jos; Tijs, S.
