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作者：Galbiati, Roberto; Vertova, Pietro
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Insubria; University of Bergamo
摘要：Laws express rules of conduct ('obligations') enforced by the means of penalties and rewards ('incentives'). The role of incentives in shaping individual behaviour has been largely analysed in the traditional economic literature. On the contrary, very little is known about the specific role of obligations. In this paper we test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in a public good game. The results show that. for given marginal incentives, different levels of m...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
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作者：Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs
作者单位：IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Bonn; University of Zurich
摘要：Recently developed models of fairness can explain a wide variety of seemingly contradictory facts. One of the most controversial and yet unresolved issues in the modeling of fairness preferences concerns the behavioral relevance of fairness intentions. Intuitively, fairness intentions seem to play an important role in economic relations, political struggles, and legal disputes but there is surprisingly little direct evidence for its behavioral importance. We provide experimental evidence for t...
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作者：Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Timothy C.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price scaled bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between th...
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Rego, Leandro Chaves
作者单位：Universidade Federal de Pernambuco; Cornell University
摘要：We analyze a model of interactive unawareness introduced by Heifetz, Meier and Schipper. We consider two axiomatizations for their model, which capture different notions of validity. These axiomatizations allow us to compare the Heifetz et al. approach to both the standard (S5) epistemic logic and two other approaches to unawareness: that of Fagin and Halpern and that of Modica and Rustichini. We show that the differences between the Heifetz et al. approach and the others are mainly due to the...
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作者：Mannor, Shie; Shinikin, Nahum
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; McGill University
摘要：Regret minimization in repeated matrix games has been extensively studied ever since Hannan's seminal paper [Hannan, J., 1957. Approximation to Bayes risk in repeated play. In: Dresher, M., Tucker, AW., Wolfe, P. (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. III. Ann. of Math. Stud., vol. 39, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 97-193]. Several classes of no-regret strategies now exist; such strategies secure a long-term average payoff as high as could be obtained by the fixed actio...
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作者：Calzolari, Giacomo; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Bologna
摘要：We illustrate. by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium char...
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Ostrov, Daniel N.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; Santa Clara University
摘要：We formalize Veblen's idea of conspicuous consumption its two alternative forms of interdependent preferences, dubbed envy and pride. Agents adjust consumption patterns gradually, in the direction of increasing utility. From an arbitrary initial state, the distribution of consumption among agents with identical preferences converges to a unique equilibrium distribution. When pride is stronger, the equilibrium distribution has a right-skewed density. When envy is stronger, the equilibrium is co...
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作者：Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assessment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the...
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作者：Dickinson, David; Villeval, Marie-Claire
作者单位：University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate agents to increase their effort, whereas the crowding-out literature suggests that the opposite may occur. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the employment relationship is taken into account [Frey, B., 1993. Does monitoring increase work effort? The rivalry between trust and loyalty. Econ. Inquiry 31, 663-670]. Results from controlled laboratory experiments show that ...
