Revenue equivalence revisited

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Timothy C.
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.003
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 171-192
• 关键词: bidder preferences; private values; sealed bid auctions; ascending auctions; endogenous entry

摘要

The conventional wisdom in the auction design literature is that first price scaled bid auctions tend to make more money while ascending auctions tend to be more efficient. We re-examine these issues in an environment in which bidders are allowed to endogenously choose in which auction format to participate. Our findings are that more bidders choose to enter the ascending auction than the first price sealed bid auction and this extra entry is enough to make up the revenue difference between the formats. Consequently, we find that both formats raise approximately the same amount of revenue. They also generate efficiency levels and bidder earnings that are roughly equivalent across mechanisms though the earnings in the ascending might be slightly higher. (c) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.