-
作者：Lopez-Pintado, Dunia
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：This paper studies how a behavior spreads in a population. We consider a network of interacting agents whose actions are determined by the actions of their neighbors, according to a simple diffusion rule. We find, using a mean-field approach, the threshold for the spreading rate above which the behavior spreads and becomes persistent in the population. This threshold crucially depends on the connectivity distribution of the social network and on specific features of the diffusion rule. (c) 200...
-
作者：Masso, Jordi; Nicolo, Antonio
作者单位：University of Padua; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose in alternative front a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. All allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set Of its users. Agents have gregarious Preferences over allocations: given all allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent call be forced to be a User and no agent wh...
-
作者：Hausken, Kiell
作者单位：Universitetet i Stavanger
摘要：A terrorist defends an asset which grows from the first to the second period and is attacked. With large asset growth, the terrorist's first period outcome is low caused by a large attack. With no expenditure constraint. the terrorist's total outcome is positive. With equal attack and defense inefficiencies, when the terrorist as defender requires his first period outcome to be positive, the attacker eliminates the asset ill the first period when asset growth multiplied with the Square roots o...
-
作者：Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We study axioms which define representative democracy in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We ca...
-
作者：Norman, Thomas W. L.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, E, 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets ...
-
作者：Lahkar, Ratul; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies' current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying game. and it converges globally to Nash equilibrium in potential games and in stable games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Koessler, Frederic
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes. We provide general properties of analogy-based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games. We characterize co...
