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作者：Conitzer, Vincent; Sandholm, Tuomas
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We provide a single reduction that demonstrates that in normal-form games: (1) it is NP-complete to determine whether Nash equilibria with certain natural properties exist (these results are similar to those obtained by Gilboa and Zemel [Gilboa, I., Zemel, E., 1989. Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations. Games Econ. Behav. 1, 80-931), (2) more significantly, the problems of maximizing certain properties of a Nash equilibrium are inapproximable (unless P = NP), and (3) ...
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作者：Correa, Jose R.; Schulz, Andreas S.; Stier-Moses, Nicolas E.
作者单位：Columbia University; Universidad Adolfo Ibanez; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We present a short. geometric proof for the price-of-anarchy results that have recently been established in a series of papers on selfish routing in multicommodity flow networks and on nonatomic congestion games. This novel proof also facilitates two new types of theoretical results: On the one hand, we give pseudo-approximation results that depend on the class of allowable cost functions. On tire other hand, we derive stronger bounds on the inefficiency of equilibria for situations in which t...
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作者：Kagel, John; Pevnitskaya, Svetlana; Ye, Lixin
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. Furthermore, there exist alternative bid procedures that, in theory at least, guarantee 100% efficiency and higher revenue for the seller. We employ experiments to compare actual performance between ...
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作者：Devetag, Giovanna; Warglien, Massimo
作者单位：University of Perugia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：It has been suggested that players often produce simplified and/or misspecified mental models of strategic decisions [Kreps, D., 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford]. We submit that the relational structure of players' preferences in a game is a source of cognitive complexity, and may be an important driver of such simplifications. We provide a classification of order structures in two-person games based on the properties of monotonicity, and projectivity, and p...
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作者：Potters, Jos; Tijs, S.
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作者：Porter, Ryan; Nudelman, Eugene; Shoham, Yoav
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We present two simple search methods for computing a sample Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game: one for 2-player games and one for n-player games. Both algorithms bias the search towards supports that are small and balanced, and employ a backtracking procedure to efficiently explore these supports. Making use of a new comprehensive testbed, we test these algorithms on many classes of games, and show that they perform well against the state of the art-the Lemke-Howson algorithm for 2-player...
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作者：Mezzetti, Claudio; Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa; Tsetlin, Ilia
作者单位：University of Leicester; Duke University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k(1) objects are sold in the first round and k(2) in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k = k(1) + k(2) objects than in a sequential...
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作者：Castillo, Marco E.; Cross, Philip J.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Georgetown University
摘要：We study behavioral differences across and within genders in a family of ultimatum and dictator games, We find these differences are due not only to altruistic preferences but also beliefs about the strategic behavior of others. The behavior of men in strategic Situations is not significantly more aggressive than women on average. But this average masks wide variation in intra-gender behavior. In particular, a sizable minority of males are mice, behaving timidly in strategic environments. Our ...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Dokumaci, Emin; Lahkar, Ratul
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into Foundations For the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with revision driven by insecurity and direct choice of alternative strategies. Both dynamics satisfy a condition called inflow-outflow symmetry, which causes them to select against strictly dominated strategies at...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.
作者单位：Harvard University; Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785-814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the lo...
