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作者：Deneckere, Raymond; Severinov, Sergel
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Essex
摘要：We study implementation in environments where agents have limited ability to imitate others. Agents are randomly and privately endowed with type-dependent sets of messages. So sending it message becomes a partial proof regarding type. For environments where agents can send any combination of available messages. we develop an Extended Revelation Principle and characterize the incentive constraints which implementable allocations must satisfy. When not all message combinations are feasible, stat...
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作者：Satterthwaite, Mark; Shneyerov, Artyom
作者单位：Northwestern University; Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and incomplete information in which buyers and sellers' values for the traded good are private and independently drawn. Time is discrete, each period has length 3, and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if tra...
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作者：Mu'alem, Ahuva; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment Riles will not ensure truthfulness). We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the special case where each bidder desires a specific known subset of items ...
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作者：Moulin, Herve
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：If shortest (respectively longest) jobs are served first, splitting a job into smaller jobs (respectively merging several jobs) can reduce the actual wait. Any deterministic protocol is vulnerable to strategic splitting and/or merging. This is not true if scheduling is random, and users care only about expected wait. The Proportional rule draws the job served last with probabilities proportional to size, then repeats among the remaining jobs. It is immune to splitting and merging. Among split-...
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作者：Cella, Michela
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：In this paper we analyze an adverse selection model with one principal and one agent, who are both risk neutral and have private information. We assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with that of the agent. The main result of the paper is that the principal can extract a larger share of the surplus from the agent than in the case where her information is public. The principal can design Such a contract because she exploits the fact that her type is an informative s...
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作者：Kalai, Ehud
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In many economic settings, like spectrum and real-estate auctions, geometric figures on the plane are for sale. Each bidder bids for his desired figure, and the auctioneer has to choose a set of disjoint figures that maximizes the social welfare. In this work, we design mechanisms that are both incentive compatible and computationally feasible for these environments. Since the underlying algorithmic problem is computationally hard, these mechanisms cannot always achieve the optimal welfare; Ne...
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作者：Callander, Steven
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate and to vote for the winner. When voters care only about the winning candidate (the standard formulation) a unique responsive equilibrium exists. The addition of a desire to win creates multiple equilibria, some with unusual properties. In most of these equilibria information is not aggregated effectively, and I uncover the novel possibility of negative information aggregation in which information...
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作者：De Jaegher, Kris
作者单位：Utrecht University
摘要：The literature on the electronic mail game shows that players' mutual expectations may lock them into requiring an inefficiently large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations from one another. This paper shows that this result hinges on the assumption that, with the exception of the first message, each player can only send a message when receiving an immediately preceding message. We show that, once this assumption is lifted, equilibria involving confirmations of confirmatio...
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作者：[Anonymous]
