Stochastic stability in best shot network games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo
• 署名单位: University of Pisa; University of Siena
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.001
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 538-554
• 关键词: NETWORKS; Best shot game; stochastic stability

摘要

The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations - i.e., possible mistakes that agents make - we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable states. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of a contributing agent that stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria with the largest contribution. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.