A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laclau, Marie
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.008
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 711-737
• 关键词: Repeated games; imperfect monitoring; networks; folk theorem; communication protocols

摘要

I consider repeated games on a network where players interact and communicate with their neighbors. At each stage, players choose actions and exchange private messages with their neighbors. The payoff of a player depends only on his own action and on the actions of his neighbors. At the end of each stage, a player is only informed of his payoff and of the messages he received from his neighbors. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. The main result is to establish a necessary and sufficient condition on the network for a Nash folk theorem to hold, for any such payoff function. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.