Auctions for social lending: A theoretical analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Ning; Ghosh, Arpita; Lambert, Nicolas S.
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University; Cornell University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.004
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 367-391
• 关键词: Social lending; Peer-to-peer lending; auctions; mechanism design

摘要

Prosper, today the second largest social lending marketplace with nearly 1.5 million members and $380 million in funded loans, employed an auction mechanism amongst lenders to finance each borrower's loan until 2010. Given that a basic premise of social lending is cheap loans for borrowers, how does the Prosper auction do in terms of the borrower's payment, when lenders are strategic agents with private true interest rates? We first analyze the Prosper auction as a game of complete information and fully characterize its Nash equilibria, and show that the uniform-price Prosper mechanism, while simple, can lead to much larger payments for the borrower than the VCG mechanism. We next compare the Prosper mechanism against the borrower-optimal auction in an incomplete information setting, and conclude by examining the Prosper mechanism when modeled as a dynamic auction, and provide tight bounds on the price for a general class of bidding strategies. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.