Imperfect memory and choice under risk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gottlieb, Daniel
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 127-158
• 关键词: memory; Self deception; behavioral economics

摘要

This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.