Welfare criteria from choice: An axiomatic analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Horan, Sean; Sprumont, Yves
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.005
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 56-70
• 关键词: Choice-based welfare analysis; bounded rationality

摘要

We propose an axiomatic approach to the problem of deriving a (linear) welfare ordering from a choice function. Admissibility requires that the ordering assigned to a rational choice function is the one that rationalizes it. Neutrality states that the solution covaries with permutations of the alternatives. Persistence stipulates that the ordering assigned to two choice functions is also assigned to every choice function in between. We prove that these properties characterize the sequential solution: the best alternative is the alternative chosen from the universal set; the second best is the one chosen when the best alternative is removed; and so on. We also discuss some alternative axioms and solutions. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.