When does restricting your opponent's freedom hurt you?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Pei, Harry
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.004
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 234-239
• 关键词: Normal form game; Restricting freedom; Caratheodory's Theorem

摘要

I examine the payoff consequences for a player when she removes a subset of her opponent's actions before playing a two-player complete information normal form game. When she faces a constraint on the maximal number of actions she can remove, she can be strictly better off by not removing any actions. I present such an example. I also establish sufficient conditions under which removing opponent's actions cannot hurt. As a corollary, I also characterize a necessary condition for a player's optimal Nash Equilibrium in games with generic payoffs when her opponent has strictly more actions than she does. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.