An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Voorneveld, Mark
• 署名单位: Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.011
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 316-321
• 关键词: Nash equilibrium; Axiomatization; Solution concept

摘要

For strategic games, the Nash equilibrium concept is axiomatized using three properties: (i) if the difference between two games is 'strategically irrelevant', then their solutions are the same; (ii) if a player has a strategy with a constant payoff, this player need not settle for less in any solution of the game; (iii) if all players agree that a certain strategy profile is optimal, then this strategy profile is a solution of the game. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.