Should straw polls be banned?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ali, S. Nageeb; Bohren, J. Aislinn
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.006
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 284-294
• 关键词: Information aggregation; committees; deliberation; collusion

摘要

A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or deliberating before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal uses a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation. We show using examples how she can gain if she can choose the equilibrium played by the committee, or use a non-anonymous or non-monotone voting rule. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.