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作者：Gravel, Nicolas; Poitevin, Michel
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We examine the problem of providing a non-rival and excludable public good to individuals with the same preferences and differing contributing capacities. Exclusion from the public good is costly in the sense that if two different quantities of the public good are consumed in the community, then the sum of the costs of providing the two quantities must be borne. By contrast, costless exclusion only requires the cost of the largest quantity Consumed of the public good to be financed. We show th...
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael; Seeman, Lior
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We study the problem of computing an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. (2010) suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model-modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state- and make a standard cryptographic assumption (that public-key cryptography can carried out), the problem can actually be solved in polynomial time. Our algorithm works not only for games with a finite numbe...
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作者：Hanato, Shunsuke
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：An arbitrator is often introduced into bargaining to avoid disagreement. The arbitrator's role is to impose some agreement when negotiators cannot reach an agreement. However, in models with an arbitrator, a fair agreement for negotiators is eliminated from equilibrium outcomes if the arbitrator is biased. To avoid disagreement without eliminating the achievability of a fair agreement in equilibrium, we consider introducing a mediator. While an arbitrator imposes an agreement, a mediator can o...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：I study how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on Sender's information. I consider a game in which, prior to Sender's information disclosure, Designer can restrict the most informative signal that Sender can generate. In the binary action case, I consider arbitrary preferences of Designer and characterize all equilibrium outcomes. As a corollary, I derive an information restriction that maximizes Receiver's payoffs: Whenever Designer can increase Receiver's payoffs by restricting Sende...
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作者：Roy, Jaideep; Silvers, Randy; Sun, Ching-Jen
作者单位：University of Bath; Coventry University; Deakin University
摘要：Can individual preferences for public information among heterogeneous consumers be aggregated into a meaningful social preference that does not suffer from Condorcet cycles? In a Cournot model where homogeneous producers observe a public signal about an uncertain cost of production prior to taking quantity decisions, we show that the majoritarian preference of consumers for the precision of public information is fairly well behaved so that a Condorcet winner always exists. Under a monotonicity...
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作者：Abdellaoui, Mohammed; Kernel, Emmanuel; Panin, Amma; Vieider, Ferdinand M.
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Oxford; Ghent University
摘要：We investigate time discounting under risk. To this end, we modify a popular multiple price list (MPL) design to elicit time discounting. Structural estimations of model parameters yield several new insights. For one, we find present bias to persist under risk, contrary to some previous evidence from the psychology literature. We further confirm the robustness of inverse-S shaped probability weighting. This is important inasmuch as random choice predicts the opposite shape in our setup. We als...
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作者：Castillo, Marco E.; Cross, Philip J.; Freer, Mikhail
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We explore the conditions under which behavior in a strategic setting can be rationalized as the best response to some belief about other players' behavior. We show that a restriction on preferences, which we term quasi-monotonicity, provides such a test for a family of ultimatum games. Preferences are quasi-monotone if an agent prefers an allocation that improves her payoff at least as much as that of others. In an experiment, we find that 94% of the proposers make choices that are arbitraril...
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作者：Kets, Willemien; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：University of Oxford; Northwestern University; The Santa Fe Institute; Northwestern University
摘要：Homophily, the tendency of people to associate with people similar to themselves, is a widespread phenomenon that has important economic consequences. We endogenize players' preferences for interacting with their own group by modeling the process by which players take others' perspective. Homophily emerges because players find it easier to put themselves into the shoes of members of their own group. The model sheds light on various empirical regularities and has novel welfare implications. In ...
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作者：Rusch, Hannes
作者单位：Philipps University Marburg; Technical University of Munich
摘要：A recent series of papers has introduced a fresh perspective on the problem of the evolution of human cooperation by suggesting an amendment to the concept of cooperation itself: instead of thinking of cooperation as playing a particular strategy in a given game, usually C in the prisoner's dilemma, we could also think of cooperation as collaboration, i.e. as coalitional strategy choice, such as jointly switching from (D, D) to (C, C). The present paper complements previous work on collaborati...
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作者：Nath, Swaprava; Sandholm, Tuomas
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We consider efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains. Green and Laffont (1979) proved that one cannot generically achieve both. We consider strategyproof budget-balanced mechanisms with bounded valuations that are approximately efficient. We show that a deterministic, strategyproof, and budget-balanced mechanism must have a sink whose valuation is ignored in the decision, and is compensated with all the leftover money. We find a tight lower bound on the inefficiencies of s...
