Eliciting private information with noise: The case of randomized response

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blume, Andreas; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.012
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 356-380
• 关键词: communication; garbling; information transmission; Randomized response; laboratory experiment

摘要

Theory suggests that garbling may improve the transmission of private information. A simple garbling procedure, randomized response, has shown promise in the field. We provide the first complete analysis of randomized response as a game and implement it as an experiment. We find in our experiment that randomized response increases truth-telling and, importantly, does so in instances where being truthful adversely affects posterior beliefs. Our theoretical analysis also reveals, however, that randomized response has a plethora of equilibria in addition to truth-telling equilibria. Lab behavior is most consistent with those informative but not truth-telling equilibria. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.