Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Turhan, Bertan
• 署名单位: Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Carnegie Mellon University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.015
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 199-208
• 关键词: School partitions; Divided enrollment; school choice; fairness; Non-wastefulness; Preference manipulation

摘要

This paper examines the effects of partition structure of schools on students' welfare and on incentives students face under the iterative student optimal stable mechanism (I-SOSM), introduced by Manjunath and Turhan (2016), in divided school enrollment systems. I find that when school partition gets coarser students' welfare weakly increases under the I-SOSM for any number of iterations. I also show that under coarser school partitions the I-SOSM becomes weakly less manipulable for students (when iterated sufficiently many times to reach a stable assignment) according to the as strongly manipulable as criteria defined by Pathak and Sonmez (2013). These results suggest that when full integration is not possible keeping school partition as coarse as possible benefits students with respect to their welfare and incentives they face if stability is a concern for policymakers. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.