Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yan; Kesten, Onur
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Carnegie Mellon University; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.003
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 83-100
• 关键词: college admissions; school choice; Immediate acceptance mechanism; Parallel mechanism; deferred acceptance; experiment

摘要

Since 2001, many Chinese provinces have transitioned from a sequential to a parallel school choice or college admissions mechanism. Inspired by this natural experiment, we evaluate the sequential (immediate acceptance, IA), parallel (PA), and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms in the laboratory. We find that participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under DA, followed by PA and then DA. While stability comparisons also follow the same order, efficiency comparisons vary across environments. Regardless of the metrics, the performance of PA is robustly sandwiched between IA and DA. Furthermore, 53% of our subjects adopt an insurance strategy under PA, making them at least as well off as what they could guarantee themselves under IA. These results help explain the recent reforms in Chinese school choice and college admissions. (C) 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.