The dynamics of majoritarian Blotto games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Klumpp, Tilman; Konrad, Kai A.; Solomon, Adam
• 署名单位: University of Alberta; Max Planck Society; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 402-419
• 关键词: Blotto games; Dynamic battles; Multi-battle contest; All-pay auctions; Sequential elections

摘要

We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player's overall budget. As a consequence, a player's chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses the player has accumulated in prior battles. This result is in stark contrast to equilibrium behavior in sequential contests that do not involve either fixed budgets or a majoritarian objective. We also consider the equilibrium choice of an overall budget. For many contest success functions, if the sequence of battles is long enough the payoff structure in this extended game resembles an all-pay auction without noise. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.