Let me, or let George? Motives of competing altruists

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bergstrom, Ted; Garratt, Rodney; Leo, Greg
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 269-283
• 关键词: Volunteer's dilemma; Free-rider; altruism; Donations; Let-me-do-it

摘要

Simple game theoretic models suggest that when costly individual action can benefit an entire group, larger groups fare worse than smaller groups because of the free-rider problem arising from diffusion of responsibility. Nevertheless, there are conspicuous examples of large groups in which a minority of members voluntarily supply public goods that benefit the entire group. We propose that this happens because some people get pleasure from performing a good deed, even if others would be willing and able to do it. We call such behavior let-me-do-it altruism. We perform an experiment designed to identify the presence of let-me-do-it altruism in a population. Our approach is to create a context-rich environment in which subjects reveal their preferences over group outcomes by their actions. Treatment variations provide insights into how cost and recognition impact behavior. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.