Group targeting under networked synergies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Belhaj, Mohamed; Deroian, Frederic
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.003
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 29-46
• 关键词: network; synergies; Aggregate effort; Optimal group targeting

摘要

A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts a la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.