Individual versus group choices of repeated game strategies: A strategy method approach

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cason, Timothy N.; Mui, Vai-Lam
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Monash University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.003
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 128-145
• 关键词: Laboratory experiment; COOPERATION; repeated games; strategy

摘要

We study experimentally the indefinitely repeated noisy prisoner's dilemma, in which random events can change an intended action to its opposite. We investigate whether groups choose Always Defect less and use lenient or forgiving strategies more than individuals, and how decision-makers experiment with different strategies by letting them choose from an extensive list of repeated game strategies. We find that groups use forgiving and tit-for-tat strategies more than individuals. Always Defect, however, is the most popular strategy for both groups and individuals. Groups and individuals cooperate at similar rates overall, and they seldom experiment with different strategies in later supergames. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.