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作者：Ghosh, Gagan
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Fullerton
摘要：We study the sale of two units of a good through simultaneous sealed bid first price auctions to bidders who have private types and multi-unit demand. Bidders are differentiated based on their valuations and budgets. Under a parametric restriction, we show that this auction game is better-reply secure and thus possesses a Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, bidders expend their budgets. The equilibrium strategies are essentially pure in the sense that each bidder-type has a unique split (up to a...
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作者：Lippert, Steffen; Tremewan, James
作者单位：University of Auckland; University of Auckland; University of Auckland; University of Auckland
摘要：We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2021a). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast, we find that Pledge-and-Review increases efficiency in all the settings we investigate, and that the improvement is most persistent in our setting without uncertainty. Our results suggest that the Ple...
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作者：Tsakas, Elias; Tsakas, Nikolas
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Cyprus
摘要：We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We first characterize the optimal signal in the prosecutor-judge game from Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) with a noisy and strongly symmetric communication channel and show that the sender's payoff increases in the number of messages. This implies that, with exogenous noise, the sender prefers to complicate communication. Then, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the send...
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作者：Coffman, Katherine; Flikkema, Clio Bryant; Shurchkov, Olga
作者单位：Harvard University; Wellesley College; Wellesley College
摘要：We explore how groups deliberate and decide on ideas in an experiment with communi-cation. We find that gender biases play a significant role in which group members are chosen to answer on behalf of the group. Conditional on the quality of their ideas, individuals are less likely to be selected in gender incongruent domains (i.e. male-typed domains for women; female-typed domains for men). Individuals are also less likely to promote themselves when they are in the gender minority within their ...
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作者：Sun, Junze; Schram, Arthur; Sloof, Randolph
作者单位：European University Institute; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We construct an election game to study the electoral impacts of biased candidate endorsements. We derive a set of testable predictions. We test these in a laboratory experiment and find that observed election outcomes and vote shares are well predicted. We find no support, however, for our prediction that the relationship between election outcome and the endorser's bias is non-monotonic; i.e., ex ante, a candidate's winning probability will first increase and then decrease as the endorser beco...
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作者：Edelman, Paul H.; Por, Attila
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University; Western Kentucky University
摘要：In this paper we introduce a new set of axioms that characterize uniform random dictatorship (U RD) as a randomized impartial nomination rule. Unlike earlier work we use a variable population model which allows us to employ axioms that reflect consistency and proportionality-axioms that ensure that the rule behaves well with respect to the combinatorial structure of the nomination profile. Earlier work characterizing URD employed strong symmetry axioms and so it is surprising that our axioms c...
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作者：Schram, Peter
摘要：I examine a principal-agents model of subversion with externalities to illustrate a novel mechanism for why diversity can be valuable to organizations: teams of diverse agents can self-manage and discourage their teammates from subversion through compromise. In contrast to standard ally-principle type results, I find that integrating more extreme agents can result in better-behaved teams. The model describes, among other cases, radical Islamist terror groups that use foreign fighters. Because ...
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作者：Ackfeld, Viola; Ockenfels, Axel
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：We experimentally investigate people's willingness to intervene in others' decision-making in order to promote a charitable donation. We find that only a minority of those subjects who would donate themselves enforce the donation by banning the selfish choice from the decision-maker's choice menu. Bans are more acceptable if they are implemented only after the decision-makers could choose between the selfish and the prosocial option themselves. Also, many subjects decide against offering decis...
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作者：Correia-da-Silva, Joao
作者单位：Universidade do Porto; Universidade do Porto
摘要：A durable goods monopolist proposes selling mechanisms in two periods, being unable to commit in the first period on the mechanism to propose in the second. Trade is anonymous and resale is not possible. Although buyers have a continuum of possible valuations, the optimal first-period mechanism is a menu with at most two possibilities: a high price guaranteeing delivery and a low price subject to rationing. This characterization is robust to the arrival of additional buyers in the second perio...
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作者：Jann, Ole; Schottmueller, Christoph
作者单位：Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of Cologne; Tilburg University
摘要：We analyze a regime change game in which an active defender can invest in costly, unobservable defenses. We show that if there are sufficiently many potential attackers, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the defender chooses to have almost no defenses and attacks almost never occur. This provides a new perspective on coordination problems and the necessity of refinements in regime change games. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
